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Two subjects have to repeatedly choose between two alternatives, A and B, where payoffs of 
an A or B-choice depend on the choices made by both players in a number of previous choices. 
Locally, alternative A gives always more payoff than alternative B. However, in terms of overall 
payoffs exclusive choice of B is a better strategy. The equilibrium predicted by the theory of 
melioration is to exclusively play A, while the Nash equilibrium is to almost exclusively play B. The 
predictive values of such equilibria are analyzed under three different informational conditions. 
Special attention is paid to the learning processes exhibited by players. 
JEL classification: C72; C92; D83. 
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1. - Introduction 
 
The two-person Harvard game consists of two players that have to repeatedly choose between 
two alternatives, A and B, where the outcome of an A or B-choice depends on the number of 
A-choices made by both players in the last nine periods. For any strategy of the opponent, a 
pattern of individual behavior focused on local payoffs is in direct contradiction with a pattern 
of individual behavior focused on overall payoffs, the former involving a substantial loss in 
payoffs with respect to the latter. More precisely, for any strategy of the opponent, locally an 
A-choice gives always more value than a B-choice. However, if A is chosen in all the nine 
previous choices, an A-choice gives less value than a B-choice when B is chosen in all nine 
previous choices. Furthermore, every A-choice reduces the opponent’s payoffs in the current 
and future periods. 
The Harvard game was originally formulated in the framework of one decision-maker
1 (see 
Herrnstein, 1991; Herrnstein and Prelec, 1991; Herrnstein et al. 1993; Kudadjie-Gyamfi and 
Rachlin, 1996; and Warry et al. 1999). The extension developed in this paper to a game 
theoretic environment is a new one. It will be argued below that the two-person Harvard game 
represents the interdependent environment in the consumption of a good with addictive 
characteristics, or the exploitation problem of a common-pool resource. 
The interesting feature of the two-person Harvard game is that situates the predictions of the 
unique Nash equilibrium and of what will be called here the Stable Matching Equilibrium in 
Games at two extremes. The Stable Matching Equilibrium in Games is the equilibrium 
prediction developed here based on the psychological theory of individual decision-making 
known as melioration (see Herrnstein, 1991, 1997; Herrnstein and Prelec, 1988, 1991, 1992). 
The theory of melioration states that individuals at each period select that alternative that 
provided more value in the previous period. It will be shown that this pattern of behavior 
applied to the two-person Harvard game predicts that both players exclusively choose   2 
alternative  A. In contrast to this, the Nash equilibrium predicts that both players almost
2 
exclusively choose alternative B. 
Therefore, while the Stable Matching Equilibrium in Games predicts maximal exploitation of 
the common-pool resource, or maximal consumption of the alternative with addictive 
characteristics, the Nash equilibrium calls for almost complete avoidance of the addictive 
alternative, or for almost complete protection of the common-pool resource. 
In this experimental analysis the two-person Harvard game is analyzed under three different 
informational characterizations. In the first one players are informed neither of the payoff 
structure, nor of their opponent’s past choices. In the second treatment, players have 
information on their opponent’s behavior, and in the final one, players are given some 
qualitative information on the payoff structure. Therefore, the predictive value of the Nash 
equilibrium and the Stable Matching Equilibrium in Games are analyzed under three different 
informational conditions. Furthermore, it is the aim of this paper to study the individual 
learning processes followed by players in the course of the game. A method to analyze the 
“quality” of individual learning will be proposed. Finally, it will be developed a classification 
of players on the basis of the dynamic-adjustment processes exhibited. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 formally introduces the two-person 
Harvard game and derives the Nash equilibrium and the Stable Matching Equilibrium in 
Games. Section 3 describes the experimental procedure. In Section 4 the experimental results 
are reported, and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. - The Two-Person Harvard Game 
 
There are two players, i=1, 2, that have to repeatedly choose between two alternatives, A and 
B. Let xi denote the number of A-choices made by player i in the last ten choices (including 
the current one), xi∈Xi={0,1,…,10}. Functions vi
A(x) and vi
B(x) represent the i-th payoffs 
obtained from a single choice of A and B when x, where 
j i j i
A
i cx bx a x x v − − = ) , (,  
j i j i
B
i cx bx d x x v − − = ) , ( ,       i, j = 1, 2, i ≠ j. 
The parameterization followed in this paper is (a,b,c,d)=(16,0.8,0.2,10). Figure 1 represents 
the i-th payoff functions when the number of A-choices made by the opponent is zero and 
ten.
3  The i-th payoff functions for any other value of xj in Xj are in between those represented 
in the figure. Note that, for all xj in Xj, the payoff function of A is above the payoff function of   3 
B. Therefore, for all  2 1 2 1 ) , ( X X X x x x × = ∈ = , locally a single A-choice gives more value 
than a single B-choice. However, note also that vi
A(10,xj)< vi
B(0,x j) holds for all xj in Xj. 
That is, for any strategy of the opponent, if A is chosen in all nine previous choices, an A-
choice gives less value than a B-choice, when B is chosen in all nine previous choices. 
To interpret the two-person Harvard game, consider that alternative A represents an addictive 
alternative, or a bad habit. That is, irrespective of the individual’s own strategy and that of the 
opponent, alternative A always gives a higher local payoff than alternative B, but, at the same 
time, it reduces the individual’s own payoffs derived from both alternatives in the current and 
future periods. Therefore, the consequences of choosing A once are suffered in the next 
rounds. With a B-choice, however, the individual receives a lower local payoff, but 
contributes to a larger overall payoff. Furthermore, whenever an individual selects the 
alternative with addictive characteristics (alternative A) this reduces the opponent’s payoffs in 
the current and future periods. One enjoys A and B to a lesser extent whenever the person with 
whom one is interacting chooses the alternative with addictive characteristics. 
Another interpretation of the two-person Harvard game is in the vein of a common-pool 
resource (CPR) game. A CPR is a resource for which returns are subtractable and the level of 
appropriation is difficult to limit. Typical examples of CPRs are fisheries, forests, 
groundwater basins, and irrigation systems. It is often argued that CPRs are subject to the so-
called tragedy of the commons (see Hardin, 1968), that predicts that the pursuit of self interest 
by individuals leads to overexploitation of the CPR.
4  Hence, in the two-person Harvard game, 
alternative A represents a common-pool resource; the more one and the opponent harvest the 
CPR, the less payoff one will gain from choosing the CPR. On the other hand, B represents an 
alternative market with increasing payoffs, but negatively affected by the CPR exploitation. 
Thus, locally, the CPR alternative is always attractive, however, as it will be seen below, 
players are better off protecting the CPR, and hence investing almost always in the alternative 
market. 
 
2.1.- Nash Equilibrium 
 
It is easy to show that there is a unique Nash equilibrium that happens to be symmetric and in 
dominant strategies. For any player i = 1, 2, all x in X, and any period provided that there are 
at least nine more periods to play, one’s local payoff differential between an A and a B-choice 
is (a−d)>0. However, in overall terms, since an A-choice increases xi in one unit for the next 
ten choices (including the current one), an A-choice gives a total of a−10b. Hence, it can be   4 
seen that since a−10b<d, B is a dominant best-reply for any period, provided there are at least 
nine more periods to play. By applying a similar analysis for the last nine periods of the game, 
it is concluded that the best-reply is to play A, instead of B, in the last seven periods. So, the 
Nash equilibrium calls for both players always to play B, except in the last seven periods 
when A must be chosen. Using the parameters above presented and considering 120 periods, 
the Nash equilibrium gives an individual total payoff of 1194. Note, however, that the Nash 
equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. If, instead of playing A in the last seven periods, both 
players play A in the last six periods having played B in the rest, each player will obtain a total 
payoff of 1195. 
It is important to note that the three experimental treatments studied in this paper are with 
incomplete information, and therefore, players cannot derive the Nash equilibrium from an a 
priori analysis. Note, however, that by trying different simple choice patterns, players may 
realize that, although an A-choice is locally more attractive than a B-choice, repeated A-
choices imply that A-payoffs tend to decrease, while repeated B-choices imply that B-payoffs 
tend to increase, the latter being more attractive in terms of payoffs. This would lead to 
playing best-reply, and hence to Nash equilibrium. 
 
2.2.- Stable Matching Equilibrium in Games 
 
Melioration is a simple myopic dynamic-adjustment theory of individual decision-making 
where the decision-maker has to repeatedly choose one alternative from a set of alternatives. 
The theory of melioration states that individuals consider the value obtained from a single 
choice of each alternative and then shift choice to alternatives that provide a higher value. 
Obviously, such a dynamic-adjustment theory may imply a significant loss in terms of overall 
payoffs. 
The extension of melioration developed here to a game theoretic context such as the two-
person Harvard game is straightforward. It follows the dynamic-adjustment process above 
described taking the strategy of the opponent as given. This describes a reply function that 
will be called here the melioration-reply function. Hence, since for all x∈X a single A-choice 
always gives a higher local payoff than a single B-choice, exclusive choice of A is a dominant 
melioration-reply. Therefore, exclusive choice of A on the part of both players is the 
equilibrium predicted by melioration. Drawing from the terminology used in the original 
characterization of melioration (see Herrnstein and Prelec, 1992), this is called here the Stable 
Matching Equilibrium in Games (SMEG).   5 
It is of relevance to note that, according to the parameters used, the Stable Matching 
Equilibrium in Games gives 745 units of payoff. Hence, with respect to the Stable Matching 
Equilibrium in Games, the Nash equilibrium brings about a 60% gain in efficiency. 
Therefore, while melioration predicts maximal exploitation in the CPR, or maximal 
consumption of the addictive alternative, the Nash equilibrium calls for almost complete 
avoidance of the addictive alternative, or for almost complete protection of the CPR. Recall, 
however, that the exploitation of the CPR (or the consumption of the addictive alternative) as 
it is referred to by the Nash equilibrium, is Pareto inefficient. 
 
3. - Experimental Procedure 
 
The present experimental study was conducted in the fall semester of 2000 at the Public 
University of Navarra. Sixty volunteer undergraduate students, primarily from economics, 
took part. The experiment was divided into six sessions with ten participants each. In each 
session participants were randomly divided into five independent pairs. 
Three treatments were run, each one comprising ten independent two-person Harvard games. 
In Treatment I, no information was provided as to the nature of the payoff structure. Players 
had to figure out the payoff contingencies throughout their relatively long exposure to the 
game. The hypothesis here is that players will focus on local payoffs, and hence that 
melioration will drive behavior towards the Stable Matching Equilibrium in Games. The 
instructions for Treatment I were as follows (original instructions in Spanish). 
Welcome to today’s experiment! 
In this room there are ten participants who will be put into pairs. The pairs will be fixed throughout the 
experiment. You will not know who the other member of your pair is. In this sense, the experiment is totally 
anonymous. 
The experiment comprises a sequence of 120 periods. 
The aim in this experiment is to accumulate as many points as possible. The way to accumulate points is to 
choose between two alternatives in each period: either A, or B. The other member of your pair will also 
choose between A and B. 
At the end of the experiment you will be privately paid in cash according to the total points that you have 
accumulated. Every 100 points equals 180 pesetas. 
Thank you very much for your participation! 
Hence, although players knew that they were playing with an opponent, they did not know 
with whom, nor did they have any feedback from the opponent. Participants remained in the 
same pair for all 120 periods. The computer screen, that was presented and explained to 
subjects, had two buttons, one for alternative A and one for alternative B, situated at the   6 
bottom of the screen, and two counters at the top of the screen, one showing the number of the 
period being played, and the other showing the total points accumulated through time. In each 
session the role of A and B-choices was interchanged across participants. This was to avoid 
any bias regarding the labeling or screen positioning of the buttons. 
In Treatment II players knew at each decision period the previous choice of their opponent. It 
can be hypothesized that when information on the previous choice of the opponent is 
available, imitation of the opponent’s behavior may arise, thus resulting in players trying out 
different choice patterns, a behavior which may prove more successful in terms of payoffs. 
Hence, it is hypothesized that behavior in Treatment II will tend to shift toward Nash 
equilibrium. Instructions for Treatment II were as for Treatment I, except that this extra 
information was announced. 
In Treatment III the only difference with Treatment I was the provision of some qualitative 
information on the nature of the payoff structure. Drawing from Herrnstein et al. (1993) and 
Kudadjie-Gyamfi and Rachlin  (1996), the following was included in the instructions of those 
players taking part in Treatment III. 
The points that you score in each period depend on your decision in that period and in previous periods, as 
well as on the decisions of the other member of your pair in that period and previous periods. If you choose A 
repeatedly, the number of points that you and the other member of your pair will receive from both 
alternatives decreases. On the other hand, if you choose B repeatedly, the number of points that you and the 
other member of your pair will receive from both alternatives increases.  
The hypothesis here is that when this qualitative information on the nature of the payoff 
structure is available, behavior will be more in accordance with the overall analysis of the 
game, and therefore tend to Nash equilibrium. 
Common to all treatments was the fact that no communication was allowed. On average, a 
session, including the instructions phase, took one hour and fifteen minutes. Participants were 




4. - Experimental Results 
 
The data analysis is structured in three subsections. The first analyzes the predictive value of 
the Nash equilibrium and the Stable Matching Equilibrium in Games. Also, by contrasting 
data between treatments, an analysis is obtained of the effect on behavior of the three different 
levels of information studied here. In Section 4.2 the learning processes exhibited by players 
are studied. Finally, Section 4.3 provides a classification of players on the basis of the   7 
individual behavior displayed in the final third of the experiment. The decision rule adopted 
in all the statistical tests that follow is in terms of a significance level of the 5%. 
 
4.1. – Nash Equilibrium and Stable Matching Equilibrium in Games 
 
Table I shows the proportions of A-choices at the individual and game level over the 120 
periods, the first third, the middle third, and the final third of the experiment. Note that the 
average proportion of A-choices in the final third of the experiment is close to 90% in 
Treatments I and II, while in Treatment III it approaches 70%. Figure 2 plots the cumulative 
relative frequency distributions of A-choices for the three treatments. 
 
Observation 1. In Treatments I and II the proportion of A-choices is significantly higher than 
the proportion of B-choices, while in Treatment III it cannot be rejected that there is no 
difference in the proportion of A and B-choices. 
 
In each treatment the proportions of A-choices at the game level in the final third of the 
experiment are taken. Analysis of the data at game level rather than at individual level permits 
the use of independent observations (ten independent observations per treatment). Thus, 
except when explicitly stated to the contrary, data is always considered at the game level. 
Analysis of the final third of the experiment is justified in terms of the interest in studying 
behavior after the learning phase of the game. It will be shown below that individual behavior 
in the final third of the experiment shows a remarkably stable pattern. The Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test is used to test whether, in each treatment, it cannot be rejected that there is no 
difference in the proportion of A and B-choices (for this, and the tests to be applied below, see 
Siegel and Castellan, 1988). Hence, the null hypothesis of no difference in the proportion of A 
and B-choices is rejected in Treatments I and II at significance levels below 0.1% (T = 0 in 
both cases), in favor of the alternative hypothesis of a higher proportion of A-choices. The 
null hypothesis, however, cannot be rejected in Treatment III (T  = 12, P-value equal to 
6.54%). 
Consider Figures 3, 4, and 5, where individuals are grouped together on the basis of the 
proportion of A-choices exhibited in the final third of the experiment. There it can be seen 
that, while in Treatments I and II a great majority of players shows behavior consistent with 
the melioration-reply function (more than 60% of the players chose A at least 90% of the 
time), Treatment III shows a higher dispersion across individual behavior. However, even in   8 
Treatment III, 70% of players chose A at least 70% of the time. In the whole experiment only 
one player shows a proportion of A-choices of less than 0.1. Observed choice is now 
contrasted across treatments. 
 
Observation 2. For each of the three thirds of the experiment, while Treatment III shows a 
lower proportion of A-choices than the other two treatments, there is no difference between 
Treatments I and II. 
 
The Jonckheere test for ordered alternatives is used to test the null hypothesis of no difference 
in the proportion of A-choices among the three treatments, against the alternative hypothesis 
of an equal or higher proportion of A-choices in Treatment I, as compared with Treatment II, 
and in Treatment II as compared with Treatment III. For each of the three blocks of data, the 
null hypothesis of no difference is rejected at significance levels below 0.01% (J* = 3.27, 
4.506, and 3.213 for the first, middle, and final third, respectively). When the null hypothesis 
is rejected, the Jonckheere test guarantees that at least one of the inequalities is strict. It does 
not, however, say which. A multiple comparison analysis between treatments is therefore 
applied. Table II shows that, for each of the three thirds of the experiment, while it cannot be 
rejected that Treatments I and II show no difference in the proportion of A-choices, Treatment 
III shows a lower proportion of A-choices than the other two treatments. 
Therefore, with regard to the hypothesis on imitation, it can be seen that the provision of 
information on the past choice of the opponent does not induce a significant change in 
behavior. Imitation can only be successful when one of the two players checks the 
consequences of repeated choice of B, and the other player imitates that behavior, realizing 
that such a choice pattern is better in terms of overall payoffs. However, as it will be shown in 
Section 4.2, in the vast majority of cases players do not systematically try different patterns of 
choice, and therefore, more successful behavior in terms of overall payoffs cannot be 
imitated. 
Regarding the hypothesis that the provision of qualitative information on the payoff structure 
would induce behavior consistent with best-reply, the following considerations are in order. 
Note that the proportion of A-choices in Treatment III is lower than in the other two 
treatments throughout all the experiment (Observation 2). Also, note that Treatment III shows 
a higher dispersion on the types of individual behavior (Figure 5). However, it can be seen 
that on aggregate, behavior is not closer to the Nash equilibrium than to the Stable Matching 
Equilibrium in Games (Observation 1, Table I, and Figure 2). Therefore, although the   9 
provision of explicit information on the payoff structure clearly lowers the proportion of A-
choices, it is not sufficient to promote the type of individual behavior consistent with best-
reply. Interestingly, Section 4.3 will show that Treatment III gives rise to a new, different type 
of behavior from those considered so far. 
 
4.2. - Learning 
 
Consider Table I, Figure 2, and Table III where the Spearman rank-order correlation 
coefficients are calculated at the individual and treatment level. The Spearman rank-order 
correlation coefficient is a non-parametric measure of association that is used here to relate 
the proportion of A-choices with time. For the calculus of the coefficients, data are divided in 
ten consecutive blocks of twelve periods. 
 
Observation 3. In each one of the three treatments individuals display a tendency to learn to 
play melioration-reply. 
 
In Table I it is seen that in the majority of cases the proportion of A-choices tends to increase. 
Also, in Figure 2 it can be appreciated that for each of the three treatments, the cumulative 
relative frequency distributions of A-choices show an increasing rate. Further to this, note that 
Table III shows that only one negative Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient is 
significant at the 5% level, while more than the 50% of the coefficients are significant 
positive coefficients (one-sided). Furthermore, at the aggregate, the three treatments show 
highly positive correlation coefficients. All this shows a tendency to learn to play according to 
melioration-reply rather than according to best-reply. 
The learning processes used by players in the experiment can be further analyzed by studying 
the number of runs exhibited by players. A run is a succession of choices of the same type, 
either A or B, followed and preceded by a choice of the opposite type, or by no choice. It is 
hypothesized that the number of runs tends to decline through time. This would indicate that 
players, after having tried different choice patterns, tend to adopt a stable pattern of choice. 
Table IV shows the average number of runs per game for the entire experiment, the first third, 
the middle third, and the final third.
6 
 
Observation 4. In each of the three treatments, players tend to adopt a stable pattern of 
behavior.   10 
 
For each of the three treatments, the Page test, a non-parametric procedure for dependent 
samples, is used to test the null hypothesis of no difference in the number of runs in the three 
thirds of the experiment, against the alternative hypothesis of a decreasing number of runs. 
The null hypothesis is then rejected in each of the three treatments at significance levels 
below 1% (L = 137, 136.5, and 132, respectively). It can, therefore, be argued that players in 
the three treatments tend to adopt a stable pattern of behavior. The three treatments are now 
contrasted in terms of the number of runs to see whether the informational conditions 
analyzed in this paper have an impact on the individual learning processes. 
 
Observation 5. In each of the three thirds, Treatment III shows a higher number of runs than 
the other two treatments. Furthermore, it cannot be rejected that Treatments I and II show no 
difference in the number of runs in the three blocks of data. 
 
For each of the three blocks of data, the Jonckheere test is applied to test the null hypothesis 
of no difference in the number of runs across the three treatments, against the alternative 
hypothesis of an equal or lower number of runs in Treatment I, than in Treatment II, and in 
Treatment II, than in Treatment III. Then, the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected for 
each of the three blocks of data at significance levels below 0.001% (J* = 3.821, 4.62, and 
3.935, for the first third, the middle third, and the final third, respectively). Table V provides 
the results of the multiple comparison analysis. There it is shown that, for each of the three 
blocks of data, Treatment III shows a higher number of runs than the other two treatments, 
while it cannot be rejected that there is no difference between Treatments I and II in the 
number of runs in each of the three thirds. Therefore, the provision of information on the 
payoff structure has a clear effect on the number of runs exhibited by players, and hence on 
the individual learning processes followed. 
Consider now the length of the runs (the number of periods that constitute the runs) of the less 
frequently chosen alternative (alternative B in the vast majority of cases). This gives an idea 
of the “quality” of the learning process. If, when choosing the less frequently chosen 
alternative, short runs are extensively used, the learning of the payoff structure of the two-
person Harvard game is seriously limited. Such a pattern of choice makes difficult to realize 
that repeated B-choice is best in terms of overall payoffs. Figures 6, 7, and 8 show the 
frequencies of these runs in terms of their length for the first, middle, and final third of the   11 
experiment. The lengths of runs are between one period and six periods. Runs longer than 6 
periods have not been observed.  
 
Observation 6. In the three thirds of each of the three treatments there are more one-period 
runs than of any other length. Also, in the three treatments, the number of runs of any length 
tends to decline. 
 
Figures 6, 7, and 8 clearly show what is stated in Observation 6.  
 
Observation 7. While Treatment III shows a higher number of one and two-period runs than 
the other two treatments, it cannot be rejected that there is no difference in the number of runs 
longer than two periods among the three treatments.  
 
Table VI shows the results of the application of the Jonckheere test when, for each of the 
three thirds, the three treatments are contrasted on the basis of the number of runs of each 
length.
7  It can be seen that, for each of the three thirds, the null hypothesis of no difference 
among the three treatments in the number of one and two-period runs is rejected at 
significance levels below 5%, in favor of an equal or higher number of one and two-period 
runs in Treatment III than in Treatment II, and in Treatment II than in Treatment I. The null 
hypothesis of no difference cannot be rejected in the case of three-period runs. Table VII 
reports the results of the multiple comparison analysis for one and two-period runs. 
Runs of the less frequently chosen alternative longer than two periods are rare in the three 
treatments. This holds even in the first third of the experiment. As it was previously argued, 
this shows a poor searching strategy on the payoff contingencies, that, of course, hinders the 
learning of best-reply. Moreover, the fact that Treatment III differs from the other two 
treatments only in the number of one and two-period runs of the less frequently chosen 
alternative, shows that the provision of information explicitly stressing the importance of 
repeated B-choice has only a superficial impact on behavior. 
 
4.3. - Classification of Players 
 
What follows is a proposed classification of players by the type of behavior exhibited. This 
must be taken as a suggested classification. Criteria other than the one followed here could 
also be applied.   12 
For each player an analysis will be made of the final third of data, when some stabilization in 
behavior has been reached. Players are classified on the basis of the decision rule that most 
closely approaches their observed behavior. The decision rules considered are the 
melioration-reply function, the best-reply function, and the alternating decision rule. The first 
two are already known. The former calls for repeated selection of alternative A, while the 
latter calls for repeated selection of alternative B, except, of course, in the last 7 periods where 
A must be chosen. So, if a player chooses alternative A (alternatively B) 90% of the time or 
more, that player will be classified as following strict melioration-reply (strict best-reply). If a 
player chooses alternative A ( B) between 75% and 90% of the time, that player will be 
classified as following melioration-reply (best-reply).
8 
The alternating decision rule calls for a stable pattern of alternation between A and B-choices. 
In the post-experimental debriefing some players reflected the alternating decision rule. The 
argument of these players was that alternating between A and B-choices enabled them to 
maintain a reasonable level of payoffs on alternative A. B-choices, therefore, were somewhat 
like investments on which the payoffs were attached to the A-alternative. The specific version 
of the alternating decision rule varies across players. Some show behavior that closely 
approaches a symmetric pattern of alternation (a number of A-choices followed by the same 
number of B-choices, where the number of consecutive equal choices was primarily one or 
two), while others show asymmetry in the number of consecutive choices of the same sign. Of 
course, the same player may show different patterns of alternation over time. 
 
Observation 8. On aggregate, the majority of players (more than 75%), can be classified as 
exhibiting behavior consistent with melioration-reply, while only one player out of sixty can 
be classified as exhibiting behavior consistent with best-reply. Treatments I and II show a 
similar classification of players. It is in Treatment III where a significant change occurs; the 
percentage of players classified as exhibiting behavior consistent with melioration-reply falls 
from 90% to 45%, and the percentage of players classified as exhibiting behavior consistent 
with the alternating decision rule increases from practically zero to 50%.  
 
Table VIII shows the classification of players per treatment. As in previous sections, 
Treatments I and II show significantly similar results that clearly favor melioration. In these 
treatments the great majority of subjects (90%) is classified as exhibiting behavior consistent 
with melioration-reply. The provision of qualitative information on the payoff structure is not 
sufficient for players to learn to play best-reply. No player in Treatment III can be classified   13 
as exhibiting behavior consistent with best-reply. However, 50% of the subjects in Treatment 
III, those classified as exhibiting behavior consistent with the alternating decision rule, seem 
to show some awareness of the payoff contingencies, but they are still too interested in the 
relatively high local payoffs of alternative A. It must also be mentioned that in the entire 
experiment only one player (in Treatment I) showed behavior consistent with the best-reply 
function. 
 
5. - Concluding Remarks 
 
The experimental results obtained favor the Stable Matching Equilibrium in Games, rather 
than the Nash equilibrium. The mean proportions of A-choices in the final third of the 
experiment in Treatments I and II are close to 90%, while in Treatment III a proportion of 
almost 70% is observed. With no information on the payoff structure (Treatments I and II), 
90% of the players were classified as exhibiting behavior consistent with melioration. The 
provision of qualitative information on the payoff structure (Treatment III) lowers this 
percentage to 45%. It must also be noted that, with the provision of such information, a new 
type of decision-making rule emerges, the alternating decision rule, held up by the fact that 
50% of the players in Treatment III are classified as exhibiting behavior consistent with it. 
Players following the alternating decision rule show some awareness of the payoff 
contingencies of the game in the sense that they choose B intermittently in order to prevent 
excessive reduction in A-payoffs. Only one player out of 60 apparently learnt to play best-
reply. It is remarkable that this player took part in Treatment I, where no information on the 
payoff structure was provided. The analysis of the learning processes exhibited by players 
also show some interesting results. First, it emerges that as the experiment proceeds 
individuals display a tendency to learn to play according to melioration, rather than according 
to best-reply. That is, not only does time fail to enhance intuition on the game, but it leads 
players to show even clearer meliorating behavior. Furthermore, the “quality” of the 
individual learning processes has been studied. It has been argued that the length in periods of 
the runs of the less frequently chosen alternative serves as an indicator of how hard players try 
to learn about the contingencies of the game. Hence, since the runs of the less frequently 
chosen alternative are mostly short, the learning processes exhibited by players are “poor” in 
the sense that they do not provide the chance to learn to play best-reply. 
More research on the Harvard game could be conducted. In particular it would be of interest 
to see the effect of increasing the degree of information provided on the payoff structure. It   14 
has been shown in this experiment that explicitly describing the essential features of the 
payoff structure is not sufficient to induce behavior consistent with best-reply. It may be 
hypothesized that the provision, for example, of tables relating different patterns of choice 
with the corresponding payoffs would favor best-reply. 
Also, the hypothesis that imitation may shift behavior in the direction of Nash equilibrium 
could be further analyzed. One possibility would be to give players information on a number 
of previous choices of the opponent, paired with the corresponding payoffs. The interest here 
would be to see whether the provision of this information is sufficient to promote searching 
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FIGURE 3 
FREQUENCY OF PLAYERS ACCORDING TO THE PROPORTION OF A-CHOICES IN 
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FIGURE 5 
FREQUENCY OF PLAYERS ACCORDING TO THE PROPORTION OF A-CHOICES IN 




























FREQUENCY OF RUNS OF THE LESS FREQUENTLY CHOSEN ALTERNATIVE BY 
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FIGURE 7 
FREQUENCY OF RUNS OF THE LESS FREQUENTLY CHOSEN ALTERNATIVE BY 
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TABLE I 
PROPORTIONS OF A-CHOICES 
 
A) AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
 



























1:1  0.74 0.63 0.70 0.90 0.83 0.78 0.80 0.90 0.74 0.70 0.75 0.78 
1:2  0.82 0.78 0.90 0.78 0.84 0.78 0.85 0.90 0.65 0.50 0.75 0.70 
2:1  0.63 0.50 0.58 0.83 0.82 0.75 0.75 0.95 0.74 0.70 0.75 0.78 
2:2  0.95 0.90 0.98 0.98 0.79 0.58 0.88 0.93 0.68 0.60 0.70 0.75 
3:1  0.86 0.78 0.85 0.95 0.83 0.80 0.88 0.83 0.54 0.60 0.48 0.55 
3:2  0.96 0.90 1.00 0.98 0.80 0.63 0.85 0.93 0.82 0.75 0.80 0.90 
4:1  0.83 0.70 0.90 0.88 0.65 0.50 0.65 0.80 0.60 0.50 0.50 0.80 
4:2  0.83 0.73 0.95 0.80 0.78 0.55 0.80 0.98 0.51 0.53 0.50 0.50 
5:1  0.82 0.73 0.85 0.88 0.90 0.80 0.95 0.95 0.38 0.35 0.38 0.43 
5:2  0.81 0.68 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.85 0.85 0.93 0.41 0.40 0.48 0.35 
6:1  0.94 0.88 0.95 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.88 0.93 0.64 0.53 0.63 0.78 
6:2  0.96 0.93 0.98 0.98 0.72 0.58 0.85 0.73 0.68 0.63 0.68 0.73 
7:1  0.83 0.60 0.90 0.98 0.78 0.85 0.80 0.70 0.79 0.58 0.83 0.98 
7:2  0.80 0.60 0.88 0.93 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.56 0.60 0.55 0.53 
8:1  0.88 0.88 0.85 0.90 0.88 0.73 0.93 0.98 0.74 0.78 0.78 0.68 
8:2  0.87 0.78 0.95 0.88 0.93 0.95 0.90 0.95 0.38 0.40 0.38 0.38 
9:1  0.88 0.73 0.98 0.95 0.92 0.90 0.88 0.98 0.80 0.58 0.88 0.95 
9:2  0.89 0.78 0.90 1.00 0.81 0.55 0.88 1.00 0.70 0.58 0.75 0.78 
10:1  0.98 0.93 1.00 1.00 0.79 0.68 0.83 0.88 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.73 
10:2  0.56 0.68 0.85 0.15 0.61 0.43 0.55 0.85 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.43 
Aggregated Proportions of A-choices by Treatment 
  0.84 0.75 0.89 0.88 0.80 0.70 0.82 0.89 0.62 0.57 0.63 0.67 
 
 
B) AT THE GAME LEVEL 
 
Game  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10   
Treatment I 
All  Periods 0.78 0.79 0.91 0.83 0.81 0.95 0.81 0.87 0.89 0.77 
First  Third  0.70 0.70 0.84 0.71 0.70 0.90 0.60 0.83 0.75 0.80 
Middle  Third  0.80 0.78 0.93 0.93 0.86 0.96 0.89 0.90 0.94 0.93 
Final  Third 0.84 0.90 0.96 0.84 0.88 0.99 0.95 0.89 0.98 0.58 
Treatment II 
All  Periods 0.83 0.80 0.82 0.71 0.89 0.76 0.76 0.90 0.86 0.70 
First  Third  0.78 0.66 0.71 0.53 0.83 0.59 0.80 0.84 0.73 0.55 
Middle  Third  0.83 0.81 0.86 0.73 0.90 0.86 0.78 0.91 0.88 0.69 
Final  Third 0.90 0.94 0.88 0.89 0.94 0.83 0.71 0.96 0.99 0.86 
Treatment III 
All  Periods 0.65 0.68 0.82 0.51 0.41 0.68 0.56 0.38 0.70 0.43 
First  Third  0.50 0.60 0.75 0.53 0.40 0.63 0.60 0.40 0.58 0.43 
Middle  Third  0.75 0.70 0.80 0.50 0.48 0.68 0.55 0.38 0.75 0.45 
Final  Third 0.70 0.75 0.90 0.50 0.35 0.73 0.53 0.38 0.78 0.43 
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TABLE II 
MULTIPLE COMPARISONS BETWEEN TREATMENTS ACCORDING TO THE PROPORTIONS OF A-
CHOICES* 
 
  First Third  Middle Third  Final Third 
Treatments I and II  3,10ª 6,25ª 0.4ª 








* Critical Value, 8.378. 
ª The null hypothesis of no difference in the proportion of A-choices cannot be rejected. 
b The null hypothesis is rejected in favor of a lower proportion of A-choices in Treatment III. 
 
TABLE III 
SPEARMAN RANK-ORDER CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
 
Player  Treatment I  Treatment II  Treatment III 
Game 1-Player 1  0.84*  0.23  0.30 
Game 1-Player 2  0.17  0.48  0.52 
Game 2-Player 1  0.70*  0.72*  0.44 
Game 2-Player 2  0.44  0.87*  0.77* 
Game 3-Player 1  0.81*  -0.11  0.03 
Game 3-Player 2  0.62*  0.95*  0.71* 
Game 4-Player 1  0.44  0.87*  0.70* 
Game 4-Player 2  0.45  0.98*  -0.13 
Game 5-Player 1  0.28  0.55  0.34 
Game 5-Player 2  0.65*  0.21  -0.39 
Game 6-Player 1  0.62*  0.93*  0.86* 
Game 6-Player 2  0.38  0.32  0.31 
Game 7-Player 1  0.94*  -0.35  0.90* 
Game 7-Player 2  0.88*  -0.03  -0.65* 
Game 8-Player 1  0.15  0.91*  -0.45 
Game 8-Player 2  0.30  0.09  -0.26 
Game 9-Player 1  0.69*  0.66*  0.91* 
Game 9-Player 2  0.81*  0.93*  0.92* 
Game 10-Player 1  0.70*  0.82*  0.68* 
Game 10-Player 2  -0.43  0.95*  0.47 
Aggregated Coefficients by Treatment 
 0.71*  0.98*  0.95* 




AVERAGE NUMBER OF RUNS PER GAME 
 
Game  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  Total   
Treatment I 
All  Periods  32.5  35.5  20  30.5  37.5  12 29 20 23 14  25.4 
First  Third  15.5  17.5  12  17  18 8 16 9 17  10  14 
Middle  Third  12  11.5  6 5.5  9.5 4 9.5 7  5 2.5  7.25 
Final  Third  7 8 4 9  11  2 5 6 3  3.5  5.85 
Treatment II 
All  Periods  25  31  33  46.5 20.5 33.5 39.5  19  26.5 51.5 32.6 
First  Third  12 16.5 16 21.5  10.5 17 12.5  9  17.5  22.5  15.5 
Middle  Third  10.5  10 10  18.5 8  9.5  12.5 7  8 20.5  11.45 
Final  Third  4.5  6 9 8 4  8.5  16.5  4 2  9.5  7.2 
Treatment III 
All  Periods 52 56.5  60.5  91.5  77.5 54  63 60.5 56  65  63.65 
First  Third  23  21.5 23.5  35  21.5 20.5  26  20  32  22.5  24.55 
Middle  Third  14.5  19 22 33 30 20 21 20  14.5  21.5  21.55 
Final  Third 15  17 16.5  23.5  26.5 15 16.5  21.5 10 21.5  18.3   22 
TABLE V 
MULTIPLE COMPARISONS BETWEEN TREATMENTS ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF RUNS* 
 
Treatments  First Third  Middle Third  Final Third 
Treatments I and II  2.55ª 6.4ª 2.3ª 








* Critical Value, 8.378. 
ª The null hypothesis of no difference in the number of runs cannot be rejected. 




TEST OF NO DIFFERENCE IN THE NUMBER OF RUNS OF THE LESS FREQUENTLY CHOSEN 
ALTERNATIVE BY LENGTH ACROSS THE THREE TREATMENTS (JONCKHEERE TEST)* 
 
  First Third  Middle Third  Final Third 
  J* Approx.  P-value  J* Approx.  P-value  J* Approx.  P-value 








Three Period Runs  -0.19ª 42.47% 0.456ª 32.64% 0.57ª 28.43% 
* Critical Value, 1.645. 
ª The null hypothesis of no difference in the number of runs among the three treatments cannot be rejected. 
b The null hypothesis is rejected in favor of an equal or higher number of runs in Treatment III, than in 




MULTIPLE COMPARISONS BETWEEN TREATMENTS ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF RUNS OF 
THE LESS FREQUENTLY CHOSEN ALTERNATIVE BY LENTH* 
  One-Period Runs  Two-Period Runs 
 First  Third  Middle Third  Final Third  First Third  Middle Third  Final Third 
Treatments I and II  0.7ª 7.2ª 1.15ª 3.3ª 2.85ª 2.6ª 






Treatments II and III  12.1
b 9.75
b 13.6
b 5.8ª 6.75ª 9.2
b 
* Critical Value, 8.378 
ª The null hypothesis of no difference in the number of runs cannot be rejected. 
b The null hypothesis is rejected in favor of a higher number of runs in Treatment III. 
 
 
 TABLE VIII 
CLASSIFICATION OF PLAYERS 
  Treatment I  Treatment II  Treatment III  Total 
Strict Melioration  13 (65%)  13 (65%)  3 (15%)  29 (48.3%) 
Melioration  6 (30%)  4 (20%)  6 (30%)  10 (26.7%) 
Strict best-reply  1 (5%)  -  -  1 (1.7%) 
best-reply -  -  -  - 
Alternating  -  1 (5%)  10 (50%)  11 (18.3%) 
Other  -  2 (10%)  1 (5%)  7 (5%) 
Total  20 20 20 60 
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1 The term “Harvard game” was coined by Rachlin and Laibson in Herrnstein (1997, p. 189). 
2 The “almost” means that at the very end of the game it pays to make a few A-choices. This issue will be studied 
below, when the Nash equilibrium is derived. 
3 The representation in Figure 1 takes Xi as the continuum between zero and ten. 
4 However, for evidence on the contrary see Ostrom et al. (1994). 
5 The experimental data will be made available upon request. 
6 Note that the sum of the runs of the three blocks of data does not typically equal the number of runs observed in 
all the 120 periods taken together. This is because dividing data in blocks may divide a run into two, and hence it 
is counted in two blocks. 
7 Since the number of runs of four periods or more is practically concentrated around zero, the Jonckheere test is 
not applicable. However, this is a sign of the similitude among the three treatments on these types of runs. 
8 In the case of best-reply, those A-choices observed in the last 7 periods will not be counted in the 10% (strict 
best-reply) or 25% (best-reply) limit of admissible A-choices. 